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ANALYSIS
PEACE IN OUR TIME?
TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDED DOCUMENTARY

Presenter: Brendan O’Leary
Producer: Ingrid Hassler
Editor: Nicola Meyrick
 
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Broadcast Date: 13 April 2000
Repeat Date: 16 April 2000
Tape Number: TLN 014/ 00 VT 1015
Duration: 27.10
   
 
TAKING PART IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE:
 
MARI FITZDUFF, Professor of Conflict Studies at the  University of Ulster, and Director of  "INCORE"- a Global Centre for Conflict  Resolution of the United Nations University  based at the University of Ulster.  
 
THE RT HON. THE LORD OWEN,CT, EU Co- Chairman, International Conference  on former Yugoslavia, 1992-95
 
ANTHONY SMITH, Professor of Ethnicity and Nationalism,
London School of Economics
 
DR. MARY ANDERSON, Development Economist at Harvard
University, and President of "Collaborative for Development Action", Cambridge, Mass.USA
 
PAUL COLLIER, Professor of Economics at Oxford University, and currently Director of Research at the World Bank, Washington D.C., USA
 
JAMES MAYALL, Professor of International Relations, University of Cambridge
 
DONALD HOROWITZ, James P Duke Professor of Law and Political
Science, Duke University, Durham, USA

 
O’Leary: Ethnic and national conflicts rage on all inhabited continents. Over twenty three million refugees have fled from relatively recent wars, or have been expelled. Over 900 ethnic, national or communal groups are contesting their sovereign masters - demanding secession, autonomy or other constitutional rights. This is our recent past. Have we learned from it? The last century was, after all, the bloodiest in human history.

Fitzduff : To get politicians to think about conflict prevention is like getting teenagers to think about a pension. It's too far down the line.

Owen : We have tended to hold off until we're confronted with fighting. Fighting brings death, death brings television cameras, television cameras bring public rotestations and governments react.

Fitzduff : If we don't take the management of difference much much more seriously, frankly the coming millennium is going to be no different to the last millennium.

O’Leary: That was Mari Fitzduff, Professor of Conflict Studies at the University of Ulster, and David, now Lord Owen, Europe's conflict-shooter in the Balkans. They are experts in a field haunted by two questions:
What causes ethno-national conflicts?
And have we learned how to resolve or at least manage such
conflicts?
There was a moment not so long ago when South Africa, the Middle East and Northern Ireland looked ripe for resolution. Optimism is more difficult now. But there is nevertheless a big industry researching conflict-resolution - it's
President Clinton's next career move. Is all this activity producing knowledge we can use? One problem in finding answers, according to Anthony Smith, Professor of Ethnicity and Nationalism at the LSE, may lie with the people who do most of our thinking and policy-making.
 
Smith : It is certainly true that we are witnessing the growth of an international elite whereby through travel, through mass communications and so forth, a group of people are acquiring a completely cosmopolitan outlook and it is in their interest to a certain degree at any rate to downplay the importance of ethnic attachments in the populations whose conflicts they seek to alleviate, or at any rate to categorise them as primitive or backward in some sense, and
this does a disservice to the field of study and also to the resolution of the conflicts.

O’Leary: Liberal and socialist intellectuals, longing for the transcendence of ethnic affiliations, often miss the obvious. David Owen noticed this in the Balkans.

Owen : Intellectuals, often people who have spent quite a lot of time in Yugoslavia in the 50s and 60s and thought that Tito's embrace of non-alignment was a sort of great new wave of thinking, want to believe and still want to believe that Yugoslavia was ethnically integrated. They went to the coastal resorts around the Dalmatian coast and they went into places like Sarajevo where there was a very fair measure of integration and there brotherhood and unity had meant something in inter-marriages. But if you went to the rural areas, the little villages were still predominantly Serb, Muslim or Croat and there wasn't much integration and there was still a legacy of hatred from the Yugoslav civil
war that dominated 1941 to 1945. I mean more people were killed in Yugoslavia by their fellow Yugoslavs than were ever killed by the Germans or Italians coming in as occupying forces.

O’Leary: David Owen is surely right to highlight wishful thinking about ethnicity, and to emphasise history - which many intellectuals prefer to ignore. After the 1940s Marxists and liberals alike assumed that capitalism or modernity
would erode ethnicity and national identity. Realism, by contrast, suggests that it is the transition to the continuing age of nationalism - fuelled by historic ethnic antagonisms, and grievances and inequalities between groups - which is the root cause of many of our conflicts. But the economists challenge that view. Dr Mary Anderson is a Harvard-based consultant to a variety of on-governmental Organisations working in international humanitarian and
development assistance.
 
Anderson : I am repeatedly struck myself that most of today's conflicts are not about root causes because I hear people in conflict societies describe what's going on. I've heard this in country after country. They say that their conflicts have arisen out of manipulation by some people who are looking for power or wealth from the process and who are fighting for things that have to do with their personal benefits rather than social or political benefits. And people saying
we have serious injustice and problems in our own society but this war is not about those things. In fact this war is making those things worse. In Somalia, for example, many many people simply don't have any purpose in that warfare
and in fact it's demonstrated by the fact that many communities have simply withdrawn from the warfare. They don't see any ideological reason for carrying out the battle.

Collier : Whilst our image is some heroic struggle on behalf of the poor led by Che Guevara, the reality of most rebellions is that the organisation will manufacture hatred as a conscious strategy to build its fighting force.

O’Leary:
That was Professor Paul Collier, of Oxford University, another economist and presently Director of Research at the World Bank in Washington D.C.

Collier : People think that a range of grievances from ethnic hatreds to inequality, all these are the things which cause conflict and I think I can show that they don't matter and other things do.

O’Leary:
It's a very strong statement to say that they don't matter. So what are the real causes if ethnicity is mere froth, mere superstructure?

Collier : The real causes are an economic calculus of greed and poverty. The greed comes in because a lot of rebellions are either directly motivated by looting of natural resources or are financed and sustained by looting of natural resources. If we look at Africa, we find a number of rebellions which are clearly related to diamonds. The recent rebellion in one West African country, as soon as the rebel leader was offered the Ministry of Natural Resources, he stopped the combat. He was getting what he wanted without having to
fight for it.
 
O’Leary: It would be nice if it were that simple. These claims resemble one type of populist wisdom - in which people blame their leaders, and claim that they have been manipulated against their better instincts. Paul Collier's thesis that
our conflicts are primarily about greed and resources rather than grievances or inequality should prompt the question "Where are the diamonds in places like Northern Ireland or the Balkans?" Surely there, if not everywhere, what's at
stake are group identities and insecurities, self-determination, sovereignty and allegiance.
Paul Collier acknowledges that his arguments need more testing by other scholars, but the World Bank's Director of Research wants to switch the emphasis in understanding conflict on to the benefits and costs that leaders and
groups face. And he wants to debunk their noble justifications, to suggest that ethnicity is a mask for baser motives. Does this cut any ice with Anthony Smith?


Smith : It is a shallow kind of explanation and it runs into the problem of resonance - why on earth should people respond to these appeals? There has to be a genuine grievance if a large enough people are to follow the leaders, the factions who are motivated by ideas of acquisition and self- enrichment. To a large extent, such views do not take into account the depth and passion of attachments and aspirations that the particular groups of people who espouse ethnic nationalism display. Mythic elements, the role of collective memory, symbols of landscape, religious concepts such as chosen people - I am sure that there are cases that one could find in history where elites have attempted to
stir up ethnic hatred for their own ends but I don't think that this is a useful approach. There are simply too many conflicts in the world which simply cannot be explained in terms of particular groups of people who wish to play an
ethnic card.

O’Leary: Presumably that's because peoples' identities, interests and ideas are deeper and less individualist than economists assume. The sources of ethnic and national conflict surely go beyond greed and resource-struggles.
There is at least one additional source of conflict: the outsiders who were insiders, diasporas - people expelled or obliged to leave, think of the Palestinians - or whose ancestors suffered this fate - think of the Armenians, or the Catholic Irish of America. Paul Collier of the World Bank.

Collier : Diasporas are if you like time capsules of grievance. They're rich by comparison with where they came from and so they're able to finance conflict. They harbour vengeance and so they're willing to pay for it. And they don't have to put up with the consequences and so systematically diasporas are if you like more bloodthirsty for vengeance than local populations. I can show that in post-conflict societies, those societies with really big diasporas are
much more at risk of renewed conflict than those societies without diasporas. In the case of Somalia, there are I believe seventy thousand Somalis in Canada organised along clan lines. I am told that there's finance for purchase of armaments back into Somalia. I don't know whether that's the case.

O’Leary: I can confirm it having worked on Somalia.

Collier : One policy implications I think is that diasporas need to be co-opted into the peace process and diasporas shouldn't be financing renewed conflict. Western governments should be making it harder for diaspora organisations to do that.

O’Leary: But the danger is of course that in that kind of policy if you prevent the dissemination of military resources to groups conducting legitimate national liberation struggles, that they will simply be demoralised and disarmed and have
to accept the consequences of repressive governments in the domestic arena.

Collier : I can find no relationship between political repression and the incidents of conflict. And I can find no effect of democracy versus dictatorship, the degree of repression, anything like that. I can't find an effect on the conflict.

O’Leary: Things that are not in a data-base may still be very important. Total repression may work for a long time - remember Uncle Joe Stalin. Even less monstrous repression may not immediately trigger conflict - though its memory may have a long after-life. And we must not think conventionally. Democracy itself may be a source of conflict rather than resolution. The idea that the people
must rule has serious consequences.
 
Mayall : Once you say very publicly that the state belongs to the people, one of the curious consequences of this is that you make territories somehow more sacred. People are prepared to slaughter one another and that's one of the paradoxes which we now confront.

O’Leary: That was James Mayall, Professor of International Relations at Cambridge University. Democracy can cause conflict because it nationalises territories, suggesting exclusive rights for one people, the Staatsvolk, the nation.
Democracy is understood in two ways: consensually, the rule of as many as possible; or as majoritarian, the rule of the current largest number. Where majorities change frequently these rival understandings may not matter much, but where there are peoples with different ethnic allegiances elections may become censuses, and majoritarian democracy an engine of domination and stored grievance - as it was in Northern Ireland for fifty years; and as it was in the Republic of Serbia when it included Kosovo. Unchecked democracy, in short, can drive conflict. According to James Mayall so can other unstable regimes.

Mayall : What is important for human beings is a society which is predictable and that unfortunately is more important than a society which is nice or nasty. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not fundamentally about the appallingness of the regime. It was about the fact that it ceased to work, it
was about the fact that the centre broke and one could see that particularly in former Yugoslavia. Where the centre breaks and so the state cannot provide even in a coercive way the most fundamental human securities, then people will
scamper into whichever small protective unit they can find and that provides opportunities for ambitious and quite often unscrupulous people to play the ethnic card. I think it's the breaking of political structures, for whatever
reason, which triggers ethnic conflict rather than the ethnic conflict triggering the breaking of political structures.

O’Leary: That's Thomas Hobbes updated for our times: where there is no authority we get the war of all against all. In conditions of state collapse, paramilitaries and warlords - "our boys" - become sources of security and protection.
James Mayall is not defending all states, or all states' structures. He is suggesting that democracies need to provide security. So what drives conflicts are collective identities and cultures, and the pride and resentments they
generate; antagonistic and exploitative pasts; and political institutions - which vary in their inclusiveness. Politics definitely matters. Mari Fitzduff of the University of Ulster.

Fitzduff : Most of the recent conflicts emerge from the fact that groups, minority groups, do not feel included. They feel excluded and they certainly do not feel that they are equally respected either in terms of resource allocation or cultural issues so I think the whole question of equality is extraordinarily important. However I think also decision- making is also very interesting. Do for instance
politicians need to get votes from different ethnic groups to themselves? So a participatory, a power-sharing approach is also extraordinarily important. I think also one of the things we now know is that allowing ghetto-isation in any form is problematic. Ghetto-ised societies decrease the capacity for dialogue. The most important element - and the most difficult - is that we have politicians who actually set themselves up as and are seen to function in an inclusive fashion and not in an exclusive fashion.
 
O’Leary: Does equality extend to equality of nationality? Or is it equality of ethnic groups or equality of individuals which is critical?

Fitzduff : Well this is one of the most fascinating questions that we're struggling with. Increasingly we are finding that if we are more creative, if we move beyond the old agreed frameworks of nationality, that in fact we actually can have
some solutions that are more productive. I think the solution in Northern Ireland where in fact what you actually achieved almost for the first time ever between nations was an agreement that you actually could have a loyalty that extended from people within one particular region but in fact to two different nations.

O’Leary: Mari Fitzduff's admiration for bi-nationalism and multi-nationalism takes us from causes to remedies.
Do some democracies have effective repertoires for reducing conflicts? Donald Horowitz is Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University, USA, and the author of Ethnic Groups in Conflict.

Horowitz : We have some knowledge. We don't have perfect knowledge,that's for sure. Take the question of federalism and regional autonomy. I think there's very good evidence that a great many countries could benefit from federalism and regional autonomy. Regional autonomy and federalism started out in the post-colonial world as dirty words because they were thought to be latter-day versions of techniques that the colonialists used to divide and rule, but slowly over the decades many states have come to realise that there's real utility in bringing government down to lower levels where members of ethnic groups will have more of a say over their own destiny. We're slowly learning that.
 
O’Leary: Donald Horowitz is well aware that federalism and territorial autonomy are rejected by many governments because they fear they may lead to recession. His counsel is that wise governments will federalise early. But federalism may not always be possible or successful - if only because not every group will be able to have its own province. And peoples' recent histories may prevent accommodation. Must we insist that borders must always stay as they are for the sake of stability? The European Union's ex Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, David Owen, thinks exceptions are necessary.
   
Owen : Raising the question of borders with me is of course like a red rag to a bull in a sense because I argued in 1992 onwards in Yugoslavia that you would never get a resolution until you opened up the regional borders of the former Yugoslavia. Simply making their regions international borders and claiming that they were now independent countries could not resolve the basic fundamental problems that lay beneath it, and it was a great mistake not to do that. I argued publicly and even more strongly privately, well before the Kosovo war, that there was a deal available to exchange part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that part round Pale which has simply not become integrated at all in Bosnia- Herzegovina in exchange for letting the Kosovo Albanians have their independence. They will have to go back to the drawing board and ultimately reality will have to dawn and there will be negotiations again about borders and about a permanent settlement for the Balkans.  
 
O’Leary: A permanent settlement for the Balkans was, of course, where
the 20th century began. But David Owen is surely right: if borders cannot be adjusted, peoples may be adjusted instead - through genocide or expulsion. Moving borders may be better than moving people. But that may not be our only choice. Rather than adjusting borders, through secession or partition, some advocate improving our democracies, through self-help, from within. Mari Fitzduff.

Fitzduff : By and large many of the dilemmas of Northern Ireland in terms of quality and inclusion, cultural and political inclusion, that led to the tensions and violence of the last thirty years have actually been addressed not by the
politicians but actually by civil society. Now the development of the new loyalist parties here was directly attributable to a direct programme of community development whereby those alternative leaderships begin to develop at the community level and subsequently moved into politics. The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition was another example. Now all of those actually came from civil society, from local civil society.

O’Leary: So is the critical thing a second track, so to speak, operating outside of a stalemated set of political antagonisms?

Fitzduff : I think there is a huge question around issues of democracy and conflict. One of the things you will observe is that by and large the politicians, the formal politicians often find it harder to move. The reason they find it harder to move is that in a sense they're always looking at the next election, always looking at the votes in the corner that they need to get to get back into power. Now that actually means that very often they find it hard to cross boundaries.

O’Leary: Civil society in the singular invariably gets a good press; democratic politicians normally get a bad one. But to stay in their jobs democratic politicians have to represent somebody, some voters - who may belong to rival civil societies. If politicians are going to cross boundaries they need the right kinds of incentives, such as electoral systems that will facilitate minorities and reward accommodating moves. These may be missing, or extremely difficult to engineer. And it's not just politicians who need to be steered to moderate conflict.  
Aid agencies cross boundaries all the time. Mary Anderson, author of Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War, believes aid agencies need to be more self-conscious about their activities in conflict-zones.


Anderson : When aid agencies in the past have operated on the assumption that wars are about root causes and long-standing injustice or impoverishment or marginalisation, they have tended to think that if they are helping increase the
resource base in a society then they are helping reduce the potential for conflict because there will be more for people to share and better systems of justice for sharing it. That turns out not to be true. And I think the real challenge there is for aid agency people to be careful about the power that they bring into the situations and what we've found in the work we did was that aid agencies by the small decisions they make in terms of the relationships they establish with
local authority, in terms of what kind of foodstuffs they bring or what kinds of transport systems they use, what kinds of hiring policies they have, in all of these ways they are affecting the local environment in ways that either promotes the incentives of people to stay engaged in warfare, reinforcing inter-group divisions and tensions, or they can use that same set of small decisions to reinforce those parts of the social order that exist even in warfare where people remain connected across divisions rather than fighting across divisions.  
 
O’Leary: Mary Anderson echoes many who emphasise the connectedness
between peoples - suggesting interdependencies need to be worked with, rather than undermined. Interventions by NGOs must not disable local capacities for peace. We have heard some, admittedly cautious, voices suggesting what we
shouldn't assume, or do. They've mainly been advocating conflict-prevention and management. They believe in modest proposals; they entertain little hope for comprehensive resolutions. This modesty has not always been present in
the new "military humanism" that has characterised American and European interventions on behalf of Kosovar Albanians or Iraqi Kurds. David Owen.

Owen : The real criticism of our interventions whether it's from Somalia, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, even Cambodia, Haiti, is that we don't have the follow-through. We haven't got the sustained capacity from our political leaders to hold their public opinion and their public purse at the disposal of a genuine humanitarian and democratic and market- reform change. And here the politicians simply are in love with their own rhetoric.
I was appalled to discover how bad the situation was on the ground in Kosovo and that was sort of six months after the military, main military action was so to speak over, and then I was asked to go to the United States and make representations there. I turned it down. How can I go to Washington and demand resources when I knew they weren't being provided in London, Paris and Berlin.

O’Leary: Would you draw the conclusion that if you're not prepared to
commit resources to peace building afterwards, that it's
better not to intervene?


Owen : Well there's an old physician's prayer, and I was once a doctor of medicine, and it goes: From inability to leave well alone, Good Lord deliver us. And the good politician, like the good doctor, has to know when to go in and when not to.

O’Leary: We should "go in", not to do no harm, but to do significantly less harm than would otherwise occur. World-policemen and world judges, and regional variants on them, are required to prevent, as well as to punish genocide
and ethnic expulsions. Perhaps on that much there will be agreement in the United States and Europe. But to do better than stopping the worst we need to think, in both domestic and international politics, about how to create incentives
to manage ethnic and national differences equitably and democratically, to encourage inclusive, authentically representative democracies. We need political thinking that is as hard-headed as that displayed by soldiers. Are we
getting there? Donald Horowitz.


Horowitz : I think we're actually at quite a cross-roads right now. One needs to think of ethnic conflicts as natural, as flowing directly from some of the undamentals of human affiliational tendencies and yet still controllable. It's
their excesses that we want to control. We don't want to tell people that they can't play out of their ethnic affinities in any way at all.
And finally I would say that we are at a cross-roads with respect to the whole question of what we're going to prescribe. There's a good bit of exhortation at the present moment and a tendency to tell peoples exactly how they are going to lead their collective lives. My own view is that one ought to create a constitutional framework, a democratic framework, that provides incentives and at the same time leaves open an area of uncertainty about exactly how those
are going to be pursued, and if we do that I think we will be in for a rather calmer century than the one that we've just been through.

O’Leary: A calmer century, as Donald Horowitz suggests, will require less wishful thinking about the end of ethnicity and nationalism. Majoritarian democracy-the one-size-fits-all Western institutional export - must give way to a
recognition of local conditions, and of the wide range of more consensual or federal forms of democracy that are compatible with dual and multiple nationalities. That requires commitment, resources, and more clear thinking, but
it's not impossible to have more ethnic peace in our time.