The Philosophy of Science

What counts as science?
At one time, an activity could be called 'scientific' if it followed the inductive method. On these grounds, the work of Marx could be called scientific in that he based his theories on accounts of political changes in the societies he studied. Similarly, a behavioural psychologist can claim to be scientific on the basis of the methods used: observing and recording the responses of people and animals to particular stimuli, for example. So science is defined by method rather than by subject.

An example
Astronomy is regarded as a science. Astrology, however, is not. This is because the former is based on observable facts, while the latter is based on a mythological scheme.
Except: suppose astrologers could show that there was a definite link between a person's star sign and his or her behaviour. Suppose the results of a very large number of studies indicated this. Would that constitute evidence? On the face of it, it would probably depend upon who did the experiment; if it were an attempt to gather favourable information to support the previously held views, then it would not be acceptable. if it were gathered in a strictly objective way by someone who genuinely wanted to know if the phenomena of' star signs were relevant to human behaviour, then it might be claimed to be scientific. Then, even if this were regarded as a scientific basis for astrology, it would only be termed a science if its practitioners subsequently appeared to be using scientific methods of assessment and prediction.

Distinguishing features of science include the consistent attempt at the disinterested gathering of information and the willingness to accept revisions of one's theories. But what happens if one's conclusions are radically different from those of other scientists?

Heretics, orthodox and vested interests
With the rise of science in the 17th and 18th centuries, it was widely believed that the days of superstition and authority were over; everything was to be considered rationally. But has that always remained the case with science?
Once a theory, or a method of working, has become established, the scientific world tends to treat it as the norm and to be rather suspicious of any attempt to follow a radically different approach. When Darwin introduced the idea of natural selection or Einstein that of relativity, the radical changes in scientific outlook that they implied were seen by some as a threat to the steady accumulating of knowledge along the previously accepted ways of seeing the world. Although both were accepted, there was a pause for consideration.
Today there are many scientists who are held to be 'heretics' within the world of scientific orthodoxy; people whose views are so much at variance with the scientific norm that their views are often discounted.
We have already seen that there can be several different ways of approaching a single phenomenon, and that they can be simultaneously and equally valid, consequently there will always be an element of debate within scientific circles. Controversies arise where a theory does not seem to fit the established paradigm. Some views are dismissed by a majority of scientists simply because there is not sufficient evidence offered to warrant a radical re-evaluation of present views.

An example
The chemist Linus Pauling claimed that Vitamin C was a panacea that could not only cure colds, but could help resist cancer and prevent heart disease. In spite of the recognition of his work on molecular structures, for which he had received a Nobel Prize, his views on this were generally dismissed by the scientific community, although they became popular with the general public.

Other theories, once publicised, are evaluated by other scientists. The original experiments are repeated elsewhere to see if the same results can be obtained, since if something is true, it should be repeatable. Sometimes the results of attempting this are ambiguous; sometimes the attempt to repeat the experiment failed completely, and the validity and reliability of the original results are therefore called into question.

An example
The American physicists Fleischmann and Pons put forward the claim that they had achieved a breakthrough in the quest far cold nuclear fission - the possibility of creating unlimited supplies of energy by creating nuclear fission under normal laboratory circumstances. (Generally, nuclear fission can only be simulated in the very energy-intensive situations of particle accelerators, and in these circumstances, the energy generated is far, far less than the energy used in the experiment.) Clearly, if it were found that cold nuclear fission were possible, it would revolutionise the human use of energy.
This was received with a degree of scepticism, but their experiments were studied and repeated many times by other scientists. However, they failed to give any positive confirmation. The assumption made was that there must be something wrong with an experiment if its results are so much at variance with existing scientific understanding. However, this is still open for debate, and we may eventually find that cold nuclear fission is possible after all!

Scientists have to earn a living. Some are employed by universities, and they are therefore, in theory, free to explore their theories without external influence - other than the requirement that they show real advance in research in order to continue to attract funding. By the same token, the funding for such research often comes from the commercial world, and is not, therefore, totally disinterested. Other scientists are employed within various industries. Their task is to find a scientific basis and make possible the enterprise which their industry seeks to promote. They are not engaged in 'pure' science (in the sense of a quest for knowledge, unfettered by its implications) but science put to the use of industry. Their task is halfway between science and technology - they seek a basis upon which a technology can be developed in order to achieve something that will then yield a profit.

An example
A scientist employed by a drugs company is hardly likely to keep his job if his conclusion is that the disease he is attempting to combat by the development of a new drug is best cured by drinking pure fruit juice!
He or she is therefore likely to try the following:
  • isolate the element within the fruit juice which actually effects the cure;
  • synthesise that element under laboratory conditions;
  • enlist technology to manufacture and market that synthesised element in tablet form!

Alternatively, the same scientist might find a suitable post within a company that processes and markets fruit juice.

Increasingly, science is looking for commercial funding. But commercial funding is looking for new products and new ideas for developing those things in which it has a vested interest. Philosophers such as Bacon and Hume insisted that the quest for knowledge should be a disinterested one. Indeed, the fact that a scientist stands to gain a great deal from a particular conclusion to his or her research might indicate that the results should be treated with some caution. We have already seen that there are really no facts that are free of interpretation - and this flexibility, coupled with a personal motive, makes the tendency to incline towards the most favourable conclusion a real threat to impartiality!

In other words
  • Philosophy cannot determine what information is available to science: it cannot provide data.
  • Philosophy examines the use of scientific data, and the logical processes by which this information can become the basis of scientific theories.
  • Most importantly, philosophy can remind scientists that facts always contain an element of interpretation. Facts are the product of a thinking mind encountering external evidence, and they therefore contain both that evidence and the mental framework by means of which it has been apprehended, and through which it is articulated.

For reflection
What can be said about the world, and what cannot? In Tractatus (see p. 66) Wittgenstein took the view that the function of language was one of picturing the world and started with the bold statement 'The world is everything that is the case' (Tractatus 1) and equates what can be said with what science can show: 'The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science' (Tractatus 4.11).
It ends, however, with the admission that when it comes to the mystical (the intuitive sense of the world as a, whole) language fails; we must remain silent. What is seen in a moment of mystical awareness cannot be 'pictured'. It cannot be expressed literally.
Wittgenstein points to other things that cannot be described - the subject self (it sees a world, but is not part of that world) and even death (we do not live to experience death). Wittgenstein is thus setting limits to what can be said, and by implication, limits to science.
His thought might prompt us to ask:
  • Is not modern cosmology a bit 'mystical'? Does it not seek to find images (including that of the 'Big Bang') by which to express events so unlike anything experienced of earth, that literal language is of little use?
  • Does science not sometimes require imaginative leaps beyond evidence, in the formation of new paradigms within which detailed work and calculation can subsequently find its place?
  • What is the place of intuition within the scientific process? Like an eye which sees everything other than itself, intuition may underpin much of the scientific endeavour without ever itself featuring directly.

Science offers a very rich and exciting view of the world. Whether you start by considering the idea that matter is a collection of nuclear forces, rather than something solid and tangible, or whether you start with the idea that the universe is expanding outwards from the space-time singularity, creating its own space and time as it does so, modern science seems to contradict our common-sense notions. Yet in doing so it actually shakes us out of our ordinary assumptions, makes us realise that the world is not as simple as it appears. In this, science acts like philosophy: shaking assumptions and examining the basis of what is said.
Yet the impact of science on life is not confined to theoretical knowledge; it has practical consequences. Through the products of technology, science raises ethical issues, from transplants and genetic engineering to nuclear weapons, bringing it into contact with another branch of philosophy: ethics.

History Theory and Observation What counts as Science?

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